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Law's Screen Life 
Criminal Predators and What to Do about Them: 
Popular Imperatives from Screen-Based Reality 
Richard K Sherwin 
Law today lives in images the way images live 011 the screen. 111 thi, chap-
ter, 1 will describe three discrete but interrelated forms of bw's screen lifr 
and show how they play out both in actual cases and in mainstream visual 
culture. The three forms I have in mind reflect (1) law's assimilation from 
the visual mass media of familiar cognitive and cultural templates, includ-
ing character types :md story forms that tell viewers how the world works 
and the way people may be expected to behave in a given set of" circum-
stances; (2) law's exploitation of the viewer's sense of visual delight 011 the 
basis of which vivid images and dynamic image flow draw and hold atten-
tion, stick in memory, and authorize belief; and (1) law's emulation of the 
visual mass media's logic of desire, which simultaneously stokes forbidden 
fantasies while providing moral covn in the form of a predatory Other 
onto whom the viewer may displace (and thus disown) guilty pleasures. 
Law today enlists the expressive forms and authority of the visual mass 
media in the search for truth and justice in particular c:1ses. With increas-
ing frequency video displays and digital images accompany lawyers' open-
ing statements and closing ;\rguments at trial. They arc introduced as 
evidence in the form of animations, digital reenactments, and video docu-
mentaries showing tort victims living damaged lives in the wake of acci-
dents or botched surgeries or exposure to detective products or chemical 
pollutants. Prosecutors display images from police surveillance as well as 
private security cameras that have visually captured drng deals, robber-
ies, and all manner of wrongdoing. Criminal defense lawyers use amateur 
videos, perhaps fortuitously shot from a handy cell phone, to show police 
misconduct or to contradict a written police report. And increasingly, on 
appeal, judges review the visual record of the trial to assess allegations of 
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error. Did jurors, or perhaps a lower appellate judge, unreasonably con-
strue visual evidence that jurors saw at triaP Did the trial judge properly 
deem a witness hostile, thus permitting the prosecutor to ask leading ques-
tions? The visual record captures descriptive details, such as demeanor, fa-
cial expression, and tone of voice, which the proverbial "cold" record on 
appeal leaves silent or unseen, hidden beneath or between the lines of the 
court reporter's text. 
At the same time, however, new forms of visual communication and 
advocacy operate not only in the search for truth and justice before the 
bar. The visual mass media may also enlist law's expressive forms and au-
thority in the service of the media's own interests. In what follows, I shall 
tell a cautionary talc that flags this danger. It describes one of the direc-
tions that law may take along the two-way street on which both law and 
visual mass media travcl. 1 This is an example of what can happen when 
law adopts (and enforces) the logic of the visual mass media as its own. 
Everyone hears the imprint of the culture into which he or she is horn 
and raised. Each of us inherits and constantly renews an archive of cul-
tural knowledge and a repertoire of communicative practices. We can only 
tell (and respond to) the stories we know,2 or know how to decode. Each 
medium generates its own set of meaning-making practices and meaning-
construing norms. There arc scripts for negotiating certain kinds of social 
interactions, there arc character types for helping us to recognize the kind 
of person we might be dealing with, and there arc story forms at hand that 
help us to make sense of the situations we confront either in person or vi-
cariously through various audio and visual media (such as radio, film, tele-
vision, video games, and the Internet).' Once we assimilate the communi-
cation tools of everyday life they become second nature to us, which is to 
say, we arc no longcr conscious of their presence. The work they perform 
hccomcs invisible. 'fhcsc unconscious habits of meaning making make 
up what we call ordinary common scnsc. 1 Whether accurate or not, com-
mon sense depends upon the familiar images that we carry around in our 
hcads. 1 This includes images of lawyers, criminals, and the legal system 
that we acquire from popular culture. For good or frir ill, these arc the ma-
terials with which trial lawyers have to work (or work around). 
In contemporary legal practice, displaying evidence and even argument 
by way of visual images on the screen is increasingly a matter of ordinary 
expectations.'' It should not prove surprising, therefore, to find trial law-
ycrs importing popular film stories and character types as well as familiar 
cinematic styles into thcir courtroom practices. 7 Lrwycrs cannot function 
l,aw's Sncrn J,ifr IO<) 
effectively without an adequate understanding of the dominant sources 
of cultural meaning together with the dominant styles and modalities of 
communication in the communities in which they practicc.s Put simply, 
they must know not only how meanings arc made, but also, and arguably 
even more important, how meanings arc received.'! And when it comes to 
law on the screen, it is not simply a matter of what you show, it is a mat-
ter of what people sec (or think they sec), as well as what they feel, as-
sociate to, or identify with, or discount in the process of looking. These 
intuitive (mostly unconscious) cognitive operations help to constitute de-
cision making in a particular case. In short, the stories we hear and see are 
not simply a matter of content or gcnrc 111 ; the medium in which they are 
conveyed matters. 11 As the great American poet Wallace Stevens put it, 
"things as they arc, arc changed upon the blue guitar." 1-' 
New visual technologies allow lawyers today to picture evidence and 
argument with unprecedented persuasive power. We can sec inside de-
fective machines or constricted arteries; we can reconstruct accidents and 
crimes; and we can assess complex patent claims by comparing relatively 
simple visual displays of complicated technologies or processes that show 
whether an impermissible imitation exists. This capability ensures g-rcat 
strides in the search ftir truth and justice at trial. At the same time, how-
ever, pictures (in some cases, by virtue of their simplicity) may also com-
plicate the law's aspiration to attain fact-based justice. This risk arises, for 
example, when visual evidence and visual arguments import strong affec-
tive and associative content that would be impermissible if it had been ex-
pressed explicitly instead of remaining hidden on an implicit (which is to 
say, unconscious) level of meaning- making. u Law's adversarial method 
must adapt to these new cultural, cognitive, and technological condi-
tions. Legal pedagogy and jurisprudence must catch up to the realities 
(including the digitally simulated realities) that arc being- projected onto 
electronic screens in courtrooms across the nation. We need a new visual 
jurisprudence and new levels of visual literacy for lawyers, judges, and lay-
peoplc. H 
Adapting Robert Cover's famous formulation to contemporary cultural 
conditions, we may now say that for every constitution there is not only a 
textual epic but also a cinematic and perhaps even a multiplayer interactive 
one. 11 Once viewed in the context of the narratives, films, and digital (al-
gorithmically generated) representations that give it meaning, law be-
comes "not merely a system of rules to be observed," and not simply "a 
world in which we live," 11' but many different worlds, each reflecting deep 
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structures within the operating system or organizational logic of the com-
municative medium in which law's meanings unfold. 
It is important to realize that the way we respond to visual images is 
different, as a perceptual and cognitive matter, from the way we respond 
to words alone. 17 For example, law on the screen privileges meaning mak-
ing through associational logic that operates, in large part, subconsciously, 
through its emotional appeal. A viewer might be aware that an image is 
strongly linked to a particular emotional response without knowing or un-
derstanding just what the connection is. In this respect, then, visual im-
ages tend to capitalize on the power of people's intuitive, gestalt emo-
tional responses to shape their judgments. These effects operate beneath 
the radar of awareness and arc thus less amenable to critical scrutiny and 
counterargument. is It is also notable that visual images tend to have more 
impact than nonvisual expressions of the same information. This is be-
cause they tend to be more vivid and more lifelike. Studies show that 
people respond to photorealistic pictures as they would to the real thing. 19 
For instance, viewers of an IMAX movie of a roller coaster ride or of an 
unstable, camcorder-based film like The Blair Witch Project (1999) or C!o-
ve:-Jield (2008) may experience a sense of di7ziness or physical excitement 
that words alone could never induce. 
In sum, when law lives as an image on the screen the ae.1theticforms, in-
terpretive mcthod1, and narrative content of popular visual entertainment 
inevitably find their way into the courtroom. Given the stakes, studying 
the practical and theoretical dimensions of visual rhetoric should be part 
and parcel of contemporary legal education. This is particularly the case 
given that popular legal images (in court as well as in popular culture) 
often arc not what they seem. 
What does it mean for law to operate as an image on the screen? That 
is the question before us. 
The gist of my response is this: Law today lives in images thr way im-
ages live on the screen. Law's screen life is a double life. What we see on the 
screen is always more than what is shown. The key is to try to increase our 
awareness of that cultural, cognitive, and perhaps even ontological excess. 
This is particularly important in light of the fact that our visual common 
sense tells us we need no such encouragement. 
We all tend to be na·ive realists when we watch the screen. We look 
through it as if it were a window onto reality rather than the construction 
that it is. We tend to accept as true what we know or believe.211 And that 
goes for what we directly perceive with our senses in everyday life as well 
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as what we perceive on the screen. It seems natural to take visual images 
on their own terms, as if what we see were the thing itscl( what the im-
age represents. But the image is a construction. lt is bounded on all sides 
by conventions; conventions imposed by the medium in which it appears; 
conventions imposed by cultural patterns of meaning making that we have 
unconsciously assimilated; and psychological conventions that incline us 
to make certain kinds of emotional associations when faced with certain 
kinds of images. 
The image is shot through with extrinsic properties that have to do 
with visual meaning making, properties that are eclipsed by the sense of 
self-evidence, of immediate, intuitive recognition that accompanies the 
act of seeing. There arc many dimensions to explore when it comes to 
the constructed nature of visuality. 21 We could talk about the physiology 
of perception, the social and cultural construction of visual meaning, the 
cognitive function of emotion, the operation of implicit associations in re-
sponse to the image, and so on. I want to limit my fiJcus here to visual aes-
thetics and psychodynamic meaning making in the context of the criminal 
predator. When I use the word psychodynamic, I have in mind the tradi-
tional Freudian sense of depth psychology, the op<.:ration of unconscious 
fantasies, wishes, and desires. 
Inside the courtroom, all of these aspects of meaning making arc more 
or less active, though veiled. We sec as through a glass darkly-which is to 
say, vision is always subject to a complex range of internal and external in-
fluences and frames of reference. We tend to become what we see, and we 
see because of who we are. But we do not sec how this comes about. 
Jerome Bruner has taught us that our minds arc culturally distributed 
through the shared materials, the stories and storytelling methods that we 
carry around with us, and that arc "ready at hand" to help us make sense of 
things. 22 }cJr example, during a recent oral argument in Scott v. Ilarris, 2 ' 
referring to the plaintiff: who ended up a quadriplegic when the police 
used lethal force to terminate the chase on which the plaintiff led them, 
Justice Scalia said: "He created the scariest chase scene I've ever seen since 
The French Connection." Justice Scalia's reference to the famous car chase 
sequence from The French Connection (r97r) as a basis for comparing the 
crucial police video of the real car chase in the Scott case may have been 
amusing, but it was no idle joke. 
Justice Scalia may not have realized the extent to which he was trans-
ferring, by visual association, a highly significant emotion from a feature 
film onto the police video in question. Or perhaps he meant his association 
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to The French Connection to identify for others precisely the kind of affect 
that they should be expected to invest in the real chase video. Either way, 
the fact remains that familiar images inside the courtroom are being satu-
rated with extralegal meanings that operate for the most part outside our 
conscious reckoning. The image is always more than it shows. Its mean-
ing depends to a great extent on what we bring to it and what we allow it 
to bring to us. What it doesn't show is how this meaning-making process 
comes about. 
Turning to that process, I will begin with aesthetics. Then I'll address 
the natural human craving for certainty-particularly in the face of irra-
tional disorder and doubt. 
Aesthetic gratification amplifies certainty by gratifying our sense that 
we get it. For its part, science in contemporary popular entertainment has 
been invested with an almost mystical power of certainty. Its images look 
bcautiftil on the screen and the language that scientists use to describe 
those images sounds authoritative (especially when we have no idea of 
what the scientists arc talking about-like the alluring mystery of hearing 
the Catholic mass in Latin). 
There is a corollary to the quest for certainty. The more certain we wish 
to be, the less tolerance we have for disruptions that tell us the world is 
not certain at all. Unconscious eruptions-in the form of illicit fanta-
sies, wishes, and desires-are frightening and need to be controlled. Im-
ages arouse and gratify licit as well as illicit desires; and gratification, in its 
mute clarity, simulates the certainty we crave. Gratification thus often car-
ries a price. The more illicit its source, the more potent the prohibition re-
quired to condemn it. I want to suggest that there is a hidden alliance in 
the visual mass media between the quest for certainty and the logic of dc-
si rc on which the visual mass media thrivc.21 Law holds the key to this se-
cret coupling. 
Why is law so much a part of our visual entertainments? One reason is 
that the plot device of the mystery genre, the whodunit, gratifies our sense 
of closure and ccrtainty.2 ' In the end we know "whodunit," the mystery is 
solved. Melodrama is also a common staple of television and film. It, too, 
gratifies our craving for certainty-the certainty that shapes and informs 
our shared morn! order. Melodrama is all about good and evil. People like 
melodrama because it clarifies what good and evil are, and affirms that 
they arc. lt is also gratifying to identify with the good guys and to see the 
bad guys get their proper comc-uppance. 2r, 
Law figures centrally in both mystery and melodrama. Crime stories in 
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particular serve as a recurring template. The aesthetic clarity of good guys 
and bad guys in a moral universe where the truth will out in the end, and 
justice prevails, plays into our craving for certainty. Villainous criminals 
along with those heroes who find and punish them populate our melodra-
matic moral imagination. 
Law is manifestly the domain of prohibition and moral clarity. How-
ever, popular entertainment uses law on the screen for its own purposes, 
just as savvy lawyers use popular entertainment for their own purposes in-
side the courtroom. Law on television and in film not only provides the 
templates for order and clarification of conflict, but also the authority for 
prohibition. Prohibition is important to the media because illicit fanta-
sies, wishes, and desires fuel a good deal of what appears on the screen. 
Powerfol psychic forces make us attend. TV sponsors and film producers 
like good attendance. That's what they arc paying for. But you can't simply 
unleash unconscious forces. You have to restore moral and psychological 
order. Narrative coherence rC(juircs no less. 
Popular entertainment uses law not just for its storytelling templates, 
but also for law's authority to prohibit.27] ,aw provides moral cover for the 
viewer's guilty pleasures. The psychic gratification that illicit fantasies pro-
vide is morally covered by the viewer's condemnation of their source. Re-
sponsibility for the illicit belongs to the bad guy, whom the viewer is all 
too willing to condemn in the end. That condemnation purges the psyche 
of guilt. Viewers thus get what they want: jolts of stimulation that arc 
morally covered by the authority of law. And the producers of visual mass 
media get what they want: viewers. 
And the law? As it turns out, the law gets more than it bargained for. 
For there is reason to believe that the cycle of illicit fantasy and legal prohi-
bition is not simply a matter of popular entertainment. The media's logic 
sometimes leaks into the legal culture itself 
When law migrates to the screen it brings the media's logic of desire 
with it. That is what we see, for example, in the national obsession with 
the figure of the sexual predator. Our fantasies have taken on a life of their 
own. Law lives off of them in the same way as the mass media. In this 
sense, jurists today are legislating from the unconscious. That, in a nut-
shell, is my contention. In what follows, I will present evidence in support 
of my claim. 
We start with the matter of visual aesthetics as a basis for scientific cer-
tainty and truth. Consider the magical realism of pop science. Studies have 
shown that the mere presence of a photograph at trial (even a neutral one) 
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significantly increases the conviction rate compared to when no photos 
arc shown (up to 38 percent from only 8.8 pcrccnt).2s And the mere men-
tion of"ncuroscicncc" has been shown to enhance the credibility of claims 
made in its namc:''1 
Between 2003 and 2008, on average, a thousand peer-reviewed schol-
arly articles on neuroscience were being published every month. '0 The 
claims being made were wide ranging and sometimes elaborate. As early 
as 1994, f(>r example, Francis Crick had written: "your joys and your sor-
rows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal iden-
tity and free will, arc in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly 
of nerve cells and their associated molecules."n The neuroscience refrain 
resounded: mind is matter. On this view, free will dissolves in a bath of 
biochemical processes. No wonder Michael Gazzaniga asserted in 2005 
that advances in neuroscience would someday "dominate the entire legal 
systcm."P I low could it not if the hard dctcrminist claims being made in 
its name turned out to be corrcce 
And, indeed, the popular and professional enthusiasm toward f!VlRls 
(functional magnetic resonance images) in particular, which purport to 
show the human organism at work from the inside, has not been lost 011 
trial lawyers. With increasing frequency ±MRls have been showing up in 
court in personal injury cases (to make brain injuries visible to jurors), in 
criminal cases (to establish incompetence or insanity), and in the pen-
alty stage of most death penalty cases ( to show mitigation, which is to say, 
to support the defense claim that execution is inappropriate when brain 
abnormalities diminish the defendant's culpability)." At the same time, 
crime scene investigators arc increasingly submittin1; every shred of foren-
sic proof for lab testing-leading to ever-growing backlogs. As Antony 
Zuikcr, the creator of the popular television series CS!: Crime Sffnc !nvcs-
11jz;atio11, put it, "blood, hair, saliva, skin ct cetera arc forensically designed 
to tell an investigator what has happened without having any witness to a 
crimc."'·1 
The message is clear: while witnesses may lie or make mistakes, sci-
ence docs not. In this way, the new forensic technologies signal a return to 
the early days of evidence, when the credibility of physical evidence was 
thought to far outweigh eyewitness tcstimonv.' 1 If there is one thing upon 
which commentators seem to agree it is this: CSI technology is not just 
science, it is super-science. '1' And to be sure, the visual aesthetics of CSI 
technology is beautiful to behold. I believe that what we are witnessing 
here is the magical re,tlism of pop science. 
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Our aesthetic delight in the image, in rnmbinatio11 with our assimila-
tion from popular c11tertainmcnt of the authority of science, helps to au-
thorize this kind of visual scientific evidence. This is certainly the case 
when it comes to the advanced scientific technologies that arc being used 
in court, such as brain scans or tMRls. To the untrained eye, which is to 
say, to ordinary common sense, the brai11 scan looks a lot like a picture of 
the brain. But it is hardly that. The brain docs 11ot really "light up" when 
active. The !MR.Is arc really statistical maps, visualizations of data sets, in-
clicating variations in the magnetic resonance of water molecules within 
localized blood fl.ow to the brain. But this highly complex inilmnation has 
been digitally programmed to look like a brain that is lighting up in some 
parts, but not in others. The resulting image seems to give us direct access 
to the truth claim a particular advocate is seeking to prove. 
As Neal Feigenson has pointed out, it is not only nonspcci,dists who arc 
tempted to think this way. For example, an experimental psychologist ob-
served that"[ t ]here is a rc:al clanger that picturc:s of blobs on brains seduce: 
one into thinking that we can now dirc:ctly obsc:rvc: psychological con-
structs."17 The: natural inclination to vic:w tMRls as if thc:y were photo-
graphs thus poses a snious risk of incrc:asing conviction ratt.:s in casc:s in-
volving fMRJs. Nor docs this c:ven bc:gi11 to take into account the possible 
influence of forensic pop science: on television shows like: CS[: Cri1111· Scmc 
Jm;estigation. Pc:ople these days arc: apparc:ntly fascinated with cognitive 
neuroscic:ncc: and the: wide-ranging c:videntiary claims of digital forensic 
technology. Consider what we: sec: on tckvision. From 2000, the yc:ar it de-
buted, to 2006, CS!: Crime Scene ill'ucstigatio11 grew into a franchise, with 
two spinoffs: CS!: Miami and CS!: New York. ln 2004, c:ach enjoyed over 
fourtc:en million wc:el<ly vic:wers, while the original series had over twenty-
five million. Comparable shows, fraturi11g crime-stopping, cutting-edge 
technologies, have c:nsued, including f1litho11t a 'fhl((', N11111h>n, Criminal 
Mindr, and Navy NCIS: Nmml Cri111i11al Iwuc.1tigoti·vc Scr·,•ic,~on one nc:t-
work alone:. Other networks have sought to ride the wave: with similar 
shows of their own, including Th,• Closn; Crossi11g.forda11, and Bones.'~ 
This collective: visual frast sec:ks to assure us that science brings cer-
tainty. Forensic invc:stigators probe crime scenes, sc:cking physical clues 
that lead to likely suspects. Perhaps they will retrace the trajectory of a 
gunshot back to its source:, as in one episode: of NCIS."J That glare in the 
car window, it's the Rash of a gun, caught fortuitously in the frame: of an 
ATM camera, and now, by simply shifting the view on the scrc:en to an 
ovnhead police surveillance camera we readily sec the image of a driver in 
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a van. His face is quickly scanned and just as quickly dumped into a data 
base that immediately produces the identity investigators were seeking. 
Wondrous.1,ike that episode on CS! when traces of an attacker's skin were 
caught under the fingernails of a child, the result of a strugglc. 111 After be-
ing placed in a machine the size of a toaster, the skin cells glow green, like 
numinous crystals of kryptonitc, beautiful to behold. It's a quick trip to a 
skin cell data base, and presto! The criminal target's face instantly looms 
large on an adjoining screen. Like magic, except that we arc meant to con-
clude that wh,1t seems like magic is really the stuff of science, the product 
of the most sophisticated forensic technologies. Even the CS! labs seem 
magical, suffosed as they arc in a mystical violet light that adds to the un-
canny beauty of scientific truth. But is it truth, or sheer visual delight pa-
rading as truth? If the latter, then the same possibility apparently haunts 
the computer screens of professional scientists and trial lawyers alike. 
The sheer visual delight of digital forensic technologies enchants the 
eye. As one researcher concluded, "exposure to brain images in the popular 
press, which provides a physical explanation for cognitive phenomena, likely 
influences the allure of cognitive neuroscience data." 11 In short, our aes-
thetic delight in the image, perhaps in combination with our unwitting as-
similation of pop science from mainstream culture, authorizes the ersatz 
aura, what I have referred to as the "popular magical realism" of the im-
age. Needless to say, the incentive to heighten that aesthetic effect-what 
some neuroscience researchers call the "Christmas tree cffcct"42-in order 
to enhance the credibility of the image raises serious ethical concerns. 
Our aesthetic delight in the image, in combination with our assimila-
tion from popular entertainment of the authority of science, helps to au-
thorize this kind of visual scientific evidence. There arc risks, however, 
when the instant gratification of popular entertainment displaces more 
deliberate forms of judgment. There arc also risks when fantasies stirred 
by the visual mass media take on a lifr of their own. 
Consider, in this regard, the figure of the sexual predator. In recent years, 
popular entertainment seems to be obsessed with this figure. This is no 
idle fixation. There is an interesting dynamic at work here, mostly on an 
unconscious level. I rnages cause viewers to react to what they show as if 
it were the real thing. We emote in sympathy or antipathy with what we 
sec on the screen; and what we sec triggers the full gamut of sexual fan-
tasies and wishes. Sexual responses arc particularly potent. Hence, their 
popularity in the visual mass media, along with violence-and judging by 
popularity, preferably the two combined. 
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Law dramas on the screen may enact a dance of legal forms on the sur-
face, but underneath powcrh1l unconscious forces arc at work fueling the 
narrative. Film and television arc desire machines regulated tJy familiar 
symbols of authority. As Freud understood, the release of powcrfol un-
conscious forces requires equally powcrftd prohibitions to restore psychic 
equilibrium. The greater the jolt oC illicit titillation, the more sinister is 
the agent who must hear the foll force oflaw's prohibition. Perverse sexual 
fantasies demand an evil sexual predator. l f he did not exist we would have 
to invent him. T ,ikc the proverbial scapegoat, he pays the price for the 
community's sins. 
When the mass media's logic of desire migrates to legislative d1ambcrs 
and courtrooms, life imitates art. The evil predator then becomes a crea-
ture of law. Today, law is at risk of being foclcd by the same illicit fanta-
sies and symbolic prohibitions as our popular entertainments. \!Ve become 
what we watch. /\ml that is what we arc seeing i11 the domain of law per-
taining to sexual predators and child pornography. 
The sexual abuse of children has been described as "the master narra-
tive of our culturc." 11 It is a crime that has been described as "worse than 
murdcr." 11 As Amy Adler notes, no other crime so preoccupies our "tab-
loid culture."·" These popular narratives have given rise to a variety of 
distortions. For example, mass-media depictions of child abductions and 
sexually motivated murders promote the belief that childrc11 arc at great 
risk from predators lurking in schoolyards and playgrounds. Studies have 
shown, however, that the vast majority (c)3 percent) of child sexual abusers 
arc well known to their victirns. 41, According to one study, approximately 
34 percent arc family members and 59 percent arc acquaintanccs. 17 
The similarly pervasive fear of recidivism among sexual offenders has 
led to the proliferation of laws calling for indefinite civil commitment once 
criminal sentences have expired.4~ I Iowevcr, the empirical data do not sup-
port this popular belief In fact, there is reason to believe that the law's re-
sponse to the public's obsession with the figure of the sexual predator re-
flects a vicious cycle that ends up feeding, rather than allaying, the public's 
anxiety. 
Titillating screen images of the predator arouse illicit desires that draw 
(and hold) viewers' attention. The problem is that these popular images 
have a way of migrating to law's field of prohibitory action. Fantasies help 
to constitute what we fear, and may be useful to those whose objective is to 
stage the efficacy of the state's power to manage fear. Terror management 
studies, for example, have shown that terror prompts a heightened ten-
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dency to blame and punish.·1'J Punishment reestablishes social stability by 
restoring confidence in a preexisting "steady state" of conventional values 
and beliefs that undergird and authorize the punitive impulse. 
At the same time, punitive measures also restore confidence in the com-
munity's ability to police and effectively prohibit dangerous contaminants. 
The disproportionate attention paid to violent and especially sexually vio-
lent child predators in the face of statistics that belie such wildly exagger-
ated claims alerts us to the supernumerary presence of an overdetermined 
psychic significance. In a word, some strange fantasies are afoot. 
Consider, for example, the bizarre accounts of sexual and often satanic 
ritual abuses in day-care centers in the r98os. 10 This prompted a slew of 
criminal prosecutions. Perhaps most notorious was the McMartin Pre-
school Trial in Los Angeles, which ran for two years, making it the longest 
criminal trial in American history. No convictions resulted.51 
Many of these day-care cases claimed that the alleged sexual abuses 
were undertaken in order to produce child pornography. None was ever 
found. Throughout this period of "crisis" and "moral panic," the empirical 
data seemed to contradict the need for such exceptional concern and such 
extraordinary legal remedies. Yet, the public's obsession continues. 12 
So who is the predatory other? To judge from the mass media he as-
sumes a variety of guises, but the classic image from film and television 
is that of a violent, often brutal stalker of innocent children. In the hor-
ror film The Hills Have Eyes (2006), for example, a teenage girl is raped 
in front of her family by a grotesque monster with the physical character-
istics of an older man who has been deformed by exposure to radiation. 
In the r999 film 8mm, an investigator is hired to learn more about a snuff 
film involving the rape and murder of an underage girl. Her tormentor is 
an S&M star named Machine, a man of giant proportions who wears a 
black leather mask to conceal his identity when he rapes and murders his 
young victim. The explicit depiction of his abuses is meant to convey the 
demonic and sadistic nature of his actions, but their graphic nature is also 
a titillating source of forbidden fantasy and illicit arousal. 
Alternatively, the sexual predator also may be depicted as seemingly or-
dinary and nondescript. This characterization is a staple of the decade-
long television series Law and Order: SVU, which focuses its weekly plots 
on "sexually based offenses that are considered especially heinous."53 The 
series covers a range of sex crimes, especially those against children and 
teens. For example, in an episode titled "Demons" a young girl who sur-
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vives a brutal rape describes in gruesome detail the foll extent of her or-
deal.'·1 Her abuser is a serial rapist who is portrayed as a middle-aged man 
with gray hair dressed in flannel suits. The episode "Fault" features the 
classic predator, a violent stranger who tortures and rapes his vulnerable 
child victim. 11 In the first few minutes of the show viewers witness the 
murder of a family, including the rape and murder of a young girl. Two 
other children are kidnapped and tortured. The abuses they suffer include 
cigarette burns and sodomy. In the episode "Uncivilized" an eight-year-
old boy is beaten, raped, murdered, and left to die in a shallow grave by a 
middle-aged man with a history of sex crimes against children, but whose 
ordinary appearance gives no outward clue of his vicious past. 11' 
In recent years, graphic images of the sexual predator have migrated 
from the visual mass media to various public fora involving law enf<.irce-
ment and legislation. Consider, for example, this public notice from a lo-
cal law enforcement Web site: 
The predator can be anyone from any social standing in life. From 
the doctor, who we admired for his manner, to the race car driver, 
whose public persona was filled with the embraces of a multitude 
of female fans, it become apparent that there is no "typical" profes-
sion with which to associate him to. J-{e (or she) no longer hides on 
the boundaries of our school playgrounds but now exists within the 
confines of the Internet as well. Where he was once a transient he 
is now the vice president of a corporation. Where he was limited in 
choice as to where he "operated" he now resides in anonymity within 
a largely unregulated medium." 
This kind of official notice has helped to fan public fears, which in turn 
have motivated expansive prosecutions, more stringent laws, and even vigi-
lantism. For an example of the latter, consider citizen groups, such as "Per-
verted Justice," which have begun their own efhirts to hunt down sex of--
fenders.1~ Volunteers for "Perverted Justice" troll the Internet pretending 
to be underage boys and girls in an effort to catch prospective sex offend-
ers. Their efforts have been aided by partnering with the hit reality tele-
vision show called To Catch a Predator. The concept for the show debuted 
in 2004, on the television news-magazine Dateline NBC, which featured 
a series of hidden camera investigations aimed at identifying and detain-
ing alleged pedophiles who sought out minors on the Internet for sex. The 
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predators were then lured by sexually explicit communications supplied by 
the show's staff writers to meet with a decoy in a staged (televised) under-
cover sting operation. ,'J 
Society's sense of moral panic has in recent years gravitated to the In-
ternet. This kind of panic reflects profound disturbances within the com-
munity.1'0 The source of moral infection must be identified and symboli-
cally banished. (It is this drama of hysteria and ensuing sacrifice that the 
dornmentary filmmaker Andrew Jarecki presents in his riveting documen-
tary, Capturing the }riedmans.r'1) Viewed in this light, it may not be sur-
prising that in recent years the focus of child pornography law has shifted. 
Initially, the law sought to prohibit the marketing of child pornography in 
order to prevent actual harms caused to minors used in its production.r,2 
The new approach, by contrast, targets the illicit fantasies on which child 
pornography feeds and in turn fuels in the minds of its viewers-which 
might cause children harm in the future. 1'3 
In other words, the social evil has migrated from actual harm to pro-
spective harm-in the event that a pedophile might use child pornog-
raphy to seduce future victims. By taking aim at the forbidden gaze the 
law seeks to avoid the "perception of children as sexual objects."1,4 The 
paradoxical outcome, however, is that it achieves precisely the reverse of 
what it sets out to do. The evil of pornographic images (which express or 
inflame impermissible desires) now consists in the forbidden gaze itself 
Without that gaze, according to this juridical logic, the sexual purity of 
children can remain intact.65 
The problem, of course, is that (aside from its puritanical and clinically 
disputed denial of children's sexuality) the law cannot cfkctivcly target 
impermissible desire by prohibiting pornographic images, for the same 
reason that it cannot determine the existence of such images based on the 
forbidden gaze itself The desire the law seeks to proscribe may or may not 
have been present at the time the targeted image was created. Indeed, for-
bidden desires may readily be brought to an entirely innocuous image. In 
fact, experts have observed that it is precisely the sexual innocence of the 
child in view that prompts the pedophile's sexual arousal. 
Paradoxically, it is only by emulating the pedophile's forbidden gaze 
that the law against child pornography (so defined) may be implemented. 
Viewers who perform the prohibited gaze are essential to the success of 
this legal strategy. The more judges entertain prohibited fantasies while 
they look the more prohibited pornography they will find. In short, if 
pornography lies in the eye of the beholder, the beholder must assume 
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the persona of the predator she condemns in order to authorize the law's 
prohibition. Without the illicit fantasy there is nothing to prohibit. Law's 
prohibition thus remains parasitic upon the desire it condemns.1,1, 
Law as the g-reat educator in this instance teaches jurists to become 
what the law condemns so that they may sec what the law prohibits. If 
the visual mass media help to construct how and what we sec in the world 
around us, in the current child pornog-raphy context, by emulating the mass 
media's own perverse gaze, the law, as Amy Adler has written, "transforms 
the world into a pornographic place."r,, This paradoxical state of affairs, in 
which law constitutes the very evil it seeks to avert, brings to mind Freud's 
crucial insight into the way the human unconscious operates: "Whatever 
is expressly forbidden must be an object of desire."1,s In other words, the 
very act of prohibition tempts transgression. 
Thus, the cycle commences: prohibition escalates desire which in turn 
calls fcJr greater prohibition, which in turn escalates desire even further. 
The forbidden desire that stares back from the prohibited imag-c is the 
one the viewer projects onto it. This is what happens when the media's 
logic migrates to the legal system itself When lawmakers need ever-more 
threatening- predators to appease the community's growing- anxiety about 
the secret source of its g-uilty pleasures, we may say that we arc legislating 
from the unconscious. 
Overbclicf in the reliability of evidence is one way in which decision 
makers act out their rage against uncertainty. Even weak evidence may 
provide a plausible basis for acting on a desire to convict. Neuroscience 
and the vivid digital imag-es used in support of its claims may be used to 
give legitimacy to that desire. The paucity of facts as a basis for guilt has 
to be made up for in the intensity of feeling. 
Of course, the essence of our constitutional regime is to protect ag-ainst 
distortions in the quest for fact-based justice. When law takes on the life 
of images on the screen, however, those protections meet new challenges. 
These are challcng-cs that visual literacy can help us to understand and 
work through. 
In sum, we need a new tool kit and a new jurisprudence-a visual juris-
prudence-that can help us adapt to law's life on the screen. Leg-al mean-
ings backed by the police power of the state resolve concrete conflicts in 
society; meaning-s circulating in the collective consciousness (and cultural 
unconscious) adapt legal forms of prohibition and punishment to resolve 
urgent (though often hidden or disguised) social and shared intra-psychic 
conflicts. In both fields of action, actual and symbolic, conflict is the en-
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ginc of normative clarification. The study of law's screen life brings into 
view how law adapts to the cognitive, aesthetic, and libidinal demands 
of visual mass media, and how popular culture in turn transforms law's 
rituals of conflict resolution into highly charged, symbolic forms express-
ing shared fears, beliefs, fantasies, and values. 
Conclusion 
Law performs its meanings in a shared, public world that is constituted 
(and re-constituted) through an overlapping network of discrete cultural 
and cognitive practices, social institutions, and inherited textual and au-
diovisual sources.6 'J For us to understand the internal logics of law's order 
we must become mindfol of the various media in which that order is en-
acted. Each medium enjoys strengths and weaknesses that others do not. 
For example, words may assert logical propositions and deploy them in a 
more rigorous argumentative form than visual images, while visual images 
may more effectively produce verisimilitude and thereby evoke more com-
pelling perceptual, cognitive, and emotional responses than words alone. 
The stories we tell and the way that we tell them differ from one me-
dium to another. Thus, to the extent that law performs its meanings through 
narrative and image,70 its fate remains closely tied to the way in which a 
given medium rodes the meaning-making process. For example, if the 
grammar of film has taught us to instantly recognize the visual code of 
close-ups, cross-cutting, and 1nontagc (through which new rncaning;s c1ncrµ;c 
from the juxtaposition of discrete images), the digital grammar of computer-
generated imaging has taught us to similarly internalize the interactive 
code of the interface along with the command and control conventions of 
rip, burn, interact, re-synch, upload, and resend. 71 
Law's entanglement in the changing patterns of our "second nature" 
means that law cannot escape the dominant epistemological anxieties that 
may afflict a given medium. Thus we are led to ask, what becomes of law 
when, following the path of contemporary politics and marketing, it too 
flattens out on the electronic screen? What is the life of law like when it is 
lived cinematically? 
Lack of empirical support for the child pornography epidemic that has 
gripped the public and its representatives in Congress, taken together with 
a significant number of acquittals in criminal cases brought on inadequate 
evidence, point to a reality gap. There is a word for this. When mind out-
strips reality we say it is engaged in fantasy. ln the domain of child por-
nography we seem to be dealing with a collective fantasy. The question is, 
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why? Why is law caught up in the collective moral panic that surrounds 
the all-too-frightening figure of the sexual predator? A Freudian inter-
pretation suggests that we unconsciously desire what we prohibit, and the 
price we pay fcir escalating forbidden pleasures is more fimnidable prohi-
bitions. This cycle plays out in popular cnlturc when forbidden desire be-
comes the fuel that drives commercial mass media. But when the visual 
mass media's logic of desire migrates to the legal system itself~ things begin 
to go badly wrong. Then lawmakers need ever-more threatening predators 
to appease the community's growing anxiety about the secret source of its 
guilty pleasures. When that occurs we may say that lawmakers are legis-
lating from the unconscious. This is the domain of baroque law, or more 
accurately perhaps, it is the domain of the digital baroque. 72 We see this 
manifest in the ersatz or pseudo aura of pop scicnce~tbc magical-realist 
images that 1 have been discussing in this chapter. 
Fact-based justice and symbolic justice describe two poles along a spec-
trum of psychological certainty. This is not a strictly linear continuum; 
one pole may fold into (in the guise of) the other. For example, the psy-
chological need to convict increases in proportion to the rage a particular 
criminal act evokes. In cases of symbolic justice, as all show trials amply 
demonstrate, the result is known at the outset. The objective of such a le-
gal ritual is not to prove that a past event occurred, but rather to conduct 
a purification ceremony in the present. In the face of serious social dis-
ruption, either in the form of civil wrongdoing or criminality, there is 
a deep psychological need for reassurance. The rift in the social fabric 
must be repaired; certainty and normality must be restored, so that the 
original steady state of ordinary life may be rcsurned. 71 When this cannot 
be achieved through a fact-based, adversarial search for truth, a symbolic 
drama may have to do. 
A conviction is an exquisite source of certainty, but since there can be 
no evidcntiary proof for phantom crimes (either in the form of suspected, 
but uncharged crimes from the past or crimes supposed to take place in a 
possible fi1ture), proof will have to give way to a drama of outrage and con-
demnation. The paucity of facts as a basis for guilt will have to be made 
up for in the intensity of feeling associated with the psychological reality 
of reaching a conviction. In short, trials dominated by symbolic justice are 
likely to be fueled by fantasy and supported by ersatz auratic forms of ex-
pression (rooted, for example, in the culture of celebrity, "telegenic" re-
ality effects, or archetypal images of the predatory Other) rather than fac-
tual evidence. This is to be expected, since the reality being tried doesn't 
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really exist. It is a collective fantasy, a specter that haunts the community 
and ~hat calls for a symbolic agent (or scapegoat) for it to be purged. Who 
that agent is docs not really matter, but it helps if his characteristics cor-
relate with the sort of person who fits the fantasy of the Other among us, 
the predator we fear most. 
Shared fantasies in the popular imagination, like the fantasy of the 
predatory criminal, align the state's apparatus of power with the dissimu-
lating forces of symbolic justice. The titillating reality effect of the sexual 
predator thus joins the cult of celebrity and the visual delights of pop sci-
ence as yet another expression of ersatz aura in law's contemporary screen 
life. Critical assessment of this development requires the cultivation of 
new competencies. [ n short, we need an enhanced level of visual literacy. 
The adversarial testing of truth in the evolving Anglo-American com-
mon law tradition may yet preserve its efficacy as an engine for attaining 
fact-based justice. But it will take new skills to run that engine aright in 
the digital visual age that is upon us. Training in visual rhetoric and visual 
jurisprudence is a prerequisite to effectively managing the challenges pre-
sented by law's life on the screen. 
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